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Abstract
We show that some simple and useful stutter-invariant properties deﬁnable in the language of Lamport’s Simple Temporal Logic
of Actions (STLA) are not deﬁnable in STLA and present a natural extension of STLA that allows one to express all stutter-invariant
properties deﬁnable in the language of STLA.
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1. Introduction
A speciﬁcation of a concurrent system is said to be invariant under stuttering if it does not distinguish between a
sequence of states and any sequence resulting from it by replicating some of its states. Invariance under stuttering,
apart from being interesting in its own right, has applications in reasoning about hierarchically constructed concurrent
systems [3] andmodel checking via partial order reduction [4].Also, this property is important for program speciﬁcation,
because modularization and reﬁnement are natural features of stuttering, see [2,9]. Thus, identifying invariant under
stuttering speciﬁcations should be of interest to users of temporal logic.
It was shown in [12] that in propositional temporal logic PLTL speciﬁcations invariant under stuttering are expressible
by the means of the “until” and “always” operators only, or, in other words, they are expressible without the “next”
operator. In this paper we identify a “stutter-invariant” fragment of the Raw Temporal Logic of Actions (RTLA)
introduced in [9] in which we can express all speciﬁcations invariant under stuttering deﬁnable in this logic. Since in
RTLA the scopes of quantiﬁers may not contain , its “temporal part” is, actually, propositional. The main difference
between RTLA and PLTL is that the former does not contain the “until” operator and does not allow nested applications
of the “next” operator.
Itwas argued in [9] thatRTLA, and, in particular, its fragment called theSimpleTemporalLogic ofActions (STLA) are
very convenient for reasoning about concurrent systems, because they allow to describe stutter-invariant speciﬁcations
in a very natural fashion. Namely, RTLA combines two logics: a logic of actions and a standard temporal logic.
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An action is a formula without temporal operators containing variables, primed variables, and constant symbols. In
general, an action represents a relation between the current state and the next state, where the unprimed variables refer
to the current state and the primed ones refer to the next state. For example, x′ = y + 1, where x and y are variables, is
an action stating that the value of x in the next state equals the value of y in the current state plus 1.
STLA is a fragment of RTLA that is deﬁned as follows. Elementary formulas of STLA are formulas not containing
primed variables or temporal operators or formulas of the form[A]t , where A is an action. The (non-STLA) formula
[A]t states that either A holds between the current and the next states or the value of term t does not change when
passing to the next state. In this way stuttering steps which leave all variables (the state) unchanged are allowed. General
STLA formulas are obtained from the elementary ones by the means of temporal operator and classical propositional
connectives. The main feature of STLA is that all speciﬁcations it can describe are invariant under stuttering, which is
achieved by “restricting” to the state change the applications of  to an action.
“Stutter-invariance” of STLA naturally leads to the following question: “can STLA express all stutter-invariant
speciﬁcations deﬁnable in RTLA?” We show that the answer to this question is negative. 1
However, in general, the intuition of restriction of applications of  to the state change appears to be right and we
show that all stutter-invariant speciﬁcations deﬁnable in RTLA are expressible in a very natural extension of STLA—the
Extended Simple Temporal Logic of Actions (ESTLA)—deﬁned in this paper. 2 Actually, we establish a stronger result.
We prove that ESTLA with unrestricted quantiﬁcation of rigid variables (ESTLAQ) is a “stutter-invariant” fragment
of RTLA with unrestricted quantiﬁcation of rigid variables (RTLAQ) that allows us to deﬁne all stutter-invariant
speciﬁcations deﬁnable in RTLAQ. ESTLA is the restriction of ESTLAQ to the original Lamport’s RTLA. Note that
RTLAQ is an ordinary ﬁrst-order temporal logic, whereas “the proper temporal part of RTLA is propositional” and,
therefore, is not strong enough for some natural applications. As it was pointed out by one of the referees, “disallowing
(rigid) quantiﬁcation outside the scope of  makes the logic arguably rather useless; for example, one cannot express
that every element input to a queue will eventually be dequeued.”
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy address the related work [11]. In Section 3 we recall
the notion of temporal interpretation and in Section 4 we list the abbreviations of the long names of the logics under
consideration. In Section 5 we deﬁne RTLAQ and recall the deﬁnitions of RTLA and STLA from [9]. In Section 6
we present an example of a stutter-invariant property deﬁnable in RTLA, but not expressible in STLA and deﬁne the
above mentioned “stutter-invariant” fragments ESTLAQ of RTLAQ and ESTLA of RTLA in which we can express all
stutter-invariant properties deﬁnable in RTLAQ and RTLA, respectively. The proof of stutter-invariant completeness
of ESTLAQ is presented in Section 7. Finally, the last section contains the proof of the example of a stutter-invariant
speciﬁcation not expressible in STLApresented in Section 6. The proof of it is based on a simple version of Ehrenfeucht–
Fraïssé games [5,8].
2. Related work
The problem of expressibility of STLA was addressed for the ﬁrst time in [11], where it was conjectured that some
simple but natural and important stutter-invariant properties might not be expressible in STLA. 3 An extension of the
propositional counterpart of STLA, called the Generalized Temporal Logic of Actions (GTLA), was introduced to
overcome the above mentioned problem. GTLA is a fragment of PLTL without the “until” operator (we shall denote
the latter logic by PLTL−) and GTLA formulas are obtained by imposing an “STLA like” restriction on PLTL−. The
main result of [11] is an axiomatization of GTLA that is complete with respect to the usual PLTL− semantics. However,
a natural question whether all stutter-invariant properties expressible in PLTL− are also expressible in GTLA was not
discussed in [11]. 4
1 Of course, this is a theoretical question. Nevertheless, answering it would, deﬁnitely, give a deeper insight into this kind of temporal logics,
which, in turn, might lead to a better understanding of principles underlying practical veriﬁcation systems.
2 ESTLA is the “RTLA counterpart” of logic GTLA introduced in [11], see Section 2.
3 Example 10 in Section 6 is a particular case of such property.
4 The ideas lying behind the proof of Theorem 17 can be modiﬁed to show that, indeed, GTLA captures all stutter-invariant properties expressible
in PLTL−.
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3. Temporal interpretations
The semantics of all temporal logics considered in this paper is based on the notion of a temporal interpretation
deﬁned below. First we recall the deﬁnition of interpretations of the ordinary ﬁrst-order logic that is referred to as
Predicate Calculus (PC).
A PC interpretation s consists of a non-empty domain Ds , an assignment to each n-place function symbol f of
the underlying language of an n-place function f s :Dns → Ds (we treat the language constants as 0-place function
symbols), and an assignment to each n-place predicate symbol P of the underlying language of an n-place relation P s
on Ds , such that =s is the identity relation on Ds . 5
First-order temporal logics considered in this paper have two types of variables: one is ordinary variables whose
(temporal) interpretation is rigid, i.e., does not change in time, and the other is variables whose interpretation is
ﬂexible, i.e., may have different values in different states. The latter will be referred to as ﬂexible variables and will be
denoted by bold-face letters u, v, x, y, etc.
Flexible variables may not be quantiﬁed. That is, ﬂexible variables are, actually, (a type of) constant symbols of the
underlying language.
A temporal interpretation S is a sequence of states S = s0, s1, . . . which are PC interpretations over the same domain
and differ only in assignments to ﬂexible variables. Thus, we may write DS for Dsi and F S for F si , where F is a
function or predicate symbol.
Finally, let S = s0, s1, . . . be a temporal interpretation and let i be a non-negative integer. The temporal interpretation
si, si+1, . . . will be denoted by S+i . That is, if S is “the system behavior from time 0,” then S+i is “the system behavior
from time i.”
4. Abbreviations
Below we recall the abbreviations of the long names of the logics mentioned in the introduction.
• RTLA is an abbreviation of the original Lamport’s RawTemporal Logics of Actions (that does not allow appearances
of  in the scope of quantiﬁers).
• RTLAQ is an abbreviation of Raw Temporal Logics of Actions with unrestricted quantiﬁcation (that is a truly
ﬁrst-order temporal logic).
• STLA is an abbreviation of the original Lamport’s Simple Temporal Logics of Actions that is a fragment of RTLA.
• Similarly, STLAQ is an abbreviation of Simple Temporal Logics of Actions with unrestricted quantiﬁcation (that is
the “ﬁrst-order extension” of STLA).
• ESTLA is an abbreviation of the Extended Simple Temporal Logic of Actions introduced in this paper. All speciﬁ-
cations deﬁnable in ESTLA are stutter-invariant and all stutter-invariant speciﬁcations deﬁnable in RTLA are also
deﬁnable in ESTLA.
• Finally, ESTLAQ is an abbreviation of the Extended Simple Temporal Logic of Actions with unrestricted quantiﬁ-
cation. All speciﬁcations deﬁnable in ESTLAQ are stutter-invariant and all stutter-invariant speciﬁcations deﬁnable
in RTLAQ are also deﬁnable in ESTLAQ. 6
5. RTLAQ, RTLA, and STLA
We start with the language of PC that contains only two classical propositional connectives ⊥ (a logical constant
falsity) and ⊃ (implication) and the existential quantiﬁer ∃. The language of RTLAQ is obtained from the language
of PC by adding to it a unary temporal operator  (always) and dividing its variables into two sorts. One is ordinary
variables, whose temporal interpretation is rigid, and the other is variables whose temporal interpretation is ﬂexible.
The latter are referred to as ﬂexible variables and are denoted by bold-face letters u, v, x, y, etc. Flexible variables may
be primed: the meaning of x′ is the value of x in the next state. 7
5 That is, we assume that interpretations are normal, see [10, p. 78] for details.
6 Note that extending ESTLAQ with quantiﬁcation over ﬂexible variables results in a logic whose expressive power is the same as of Lamport’s
TLA.
7 Loosely speaking, ′ can be thought of as a “ﬂexible function” whose application is restricted to ﬂexible variables only.
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Connectives  (truth), ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ≡ (equivalence),  (eventually), and the
universal quantiﬁer ∀ are deﬁned in a usual manner, e.g., ¬ is  ⊃ ⊥.
The formula formation rules of RTLAQ are the ordinary ones with the following exception.
• Only rigid variables may be quantiﬁed.
That is, ﬂexible and primed ﬂexible variables are constant symbols of the underlying language.
Formal inductive deﬁnitions of RTLAQ terms and formulas are as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.
• Rigid, ﬂexible, and primed ﬂexible variables are RTLAQ terms.
• If f is a k-place function symbol and t1, . . . , tk are RTLAQ terms, then f (t1, . . . , tk) is also an RTLAQ term.
Recall that we treat constants as 0-place function symbols.
Deﬁnition 2.
• If P is a k-place predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tk are RTLAQ terms, then P(t1, . . . , tk) is an RTLAQ (atomic)
formula. 8
• If  and  are RTLAQ formulas, then so are  ⊃  and .
• If  is an RTLAQ formula and x is an ordinary (i.e., rigid) variable, then ∃x is also an RTLAQ formula.
From now on, always when writing (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, we assume that all free rigid variables of (x) are among
x1, . . . , xm.
Next we deﬁne the semantics of RTLAQ.
Let t (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, be a term, S = s0, s1, . . . be a temporal interpretation, and let d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS . We
deﬁne the value of t (x) at d in S, denoted as tS(d), by induction as follows:
• if t is a rigid variable xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, then tS(d) = di ;
• if t is a ﬂexible variable x, then tS(d) = xs0 ;
• if t is of the form x′, then tS(d) = xs1 ; and
• if t is of the form f (t1, . . . , tk), where f is a k-place function symbol, then tS(d) = f S(tS1 (d), . . . , tSk (d)).
Deﬁnition 3. Let (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, be an RTLAQ formula, S be a temporal interpretation, and let d =
d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS . We say that S satisﬁes (x) under the assignment of di to xi , i = 1, . . . , m (or just satisﬁes
(x), if the latter is a closed formula), denoted as S(d), if the following holds:
• if (x) is an atomic formula P(t1(x), . . . , tk(x)), then S(d) if and only if (tS1 (d), . . . , tSk (d)) ∈ P S ;• S  ⊥;
• S(d) ⊃ (d) if and only if S  (d) or S(d);
• S ∃x(x, d) if and only if for some d ∈ DS , S(d, d); and
• S(d) if and only if for each i = 0, 1, . . ., S+i (d).
Finally, for a class C of temporal interpretations and a formula  we write C , if all elements of C satisfy the
universal closure of .
Deﬁnition 4. Let C be a class of temporal interpretations and let  and  be RTLAQ formulas. We say that  and 
are equivalent with respect to C if and only if C  ≡ . 9 If C consists of all temporal interpretations, then  and 
are called just equivalent.
Deﬁnition 5. RTLA is the fragment of RTLAQ consisting of all RTLAQ formulas which do not contain in the scopes
of (rigid variable) quantiﬁers.
8 Note that, by deﬁnition, ⊥ is an RTLAQ formula.
9 That is, if  is (x) and  is (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, then for all temporal interpretations S ∈ C and for all d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS , S(d) if
and only if S(d).
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That is, the deﬁnition of RTLA results from Deﬁnition 2 in deleting the subscript Q and replacing the last clause
with
• if  is an RTLA formula not containing  and x is an ordinary (i.e., rigid) variable, then ∃x is also an RTLA
formula.
RTLA formulas not containing are called actions. Intuitively, an action can be thought of as a relation between two
consecutive states of a temporal interpretation, where the unprimed variables refer to the current state and the primed
ones refer to the next state.
To deﬁne the STLA we shall need the following notation.
For a term t not containing ′, we denote by t ′ the term that is obtained from t by replacing all occurrences of every
ﬂexible variable x in t with x′.
Also for a formula  and a term t not containing ′, we denote formulas  ∨ t ′ = t and  ∧ t ′ = t by []t and 〈〉t ,
respectively.
Now we deﬁne STLA as the fragment of RTLA, where each action A containing ′ appears in the form [A]t , see
Deﬁnition 6 below.
Deﬁnition 6.
• Actions not containing ′ are STLA formulas.
• If A is an action and t is a term not containing ′, then [A]t is an STLA formula. 10
• If  and  are STLA formulas, then so are  ⊃  and .
Since 〈A〉t is an abbreviation of ¬[¬A]t , the former is an STLA formula as well.
Finally, for a set of terms t = {t1, . . . , tn} not containing ′ we abbreviate the formulas A ∨ ∧ni=1t ′i = ti and
A ∧∨ni=1t ′i = ti by [A]t and 〈A〉t , respectively. It can be easily veriﬁed that [A]t is equivalent to∧ni=1[A]ti and
〈A〉t is equivalent to
∨n
i=1 〈A〉ti . Thus, both [A]t and 〈A〉t are STLA formulas.
Satisﬁability of an STLA formula by a temporal interpretation is not affected if we add to (or remove from) it
stuttering steps, see [9]. In other words, satisﬁability of STLA formulas is invariant under stuttering. To be more
speciﬁc, we need the following notation.
Deﬁnition 7. Let S = s0, s1, . . . be a temporal interpretation. For a non-negative integer i we denote by (i) the
maximal integer j i such that for all k = i, i + 1, . . . , j , sk = si . That is, (i) is the maximal integer j i such that
all computation steps of temporal interpretation S between moments i and j are stuttering. Note that if sk = si for all
k i, i.e., the computation is halted, then (i) is undeﬁned.
Let N denote the set of non-negative integers. The function  : N→ N is deﬁned by
(0) =
{
(0) if (0) is deﬁned,
0 otherwise
and
(i + 1) =
{
((i) + 1) if ((i) + 1) is deﬁned,
 (i) + 1 otherwise.
Finally, we deﬁne the temporal interpretation S by S = s(0), s(1), . . . .
By deﬁnition, S is obtained from S by removing all its stuttering steps (except for the halted part of the computation),
i.e., all states si such that no ﬂexible variable changes its value when passing to state si+1. It can be readily seen that
the above deﬁnition of “unstuttering” is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Lamport [9, Eq. (48)].
Now the precise statement of invariance under stuttering is as follows.
Deﬁnition 8. We say that satisﬁability of an RTLAQ formula (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, is invariant under stuttering if
for all temporal interpretations S and for all d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DS , S(d) if and only if S(d).
10 We follow Lamport’s notation [9, Eq. (11)], where [A]t is the result of the application of operator  to RTLA formula [A]t , cf. [11, Section
2.1], where Merz treats [A]t as a binary operator.
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Proposition 9 (Estrin and Kaminski [6, Proposition 3.6]). If satisﬁability of RTLAQ formulas  and  is invariant
under stuttering, then so is satisﬁability of  ⊃ , , and ∃x.
We refer the reader to [9] for a comprehensive study of STLA.
6. ESTLAQ and ESTLA
In this section we deﬁne stutter-invariant fragments ESTLAQ and ESTLA of RTLAQ and RTLA, respectively, in
which we can express all stutter-invariant properties deﬁnable in the corresponding logics. Both ESTLAQ and ESTLA
are extensions of STLA in the spirit of [11].
We start with an example of a “stutter-invariant” RTLA formula that does not have an STLA equivalent.
Example 10. Consider the RTLA formula (u = a ∧ u′ = b ∧ u = c), denoted as 1(u). A temporal interpretation
s0, s1, . . . satisﬁes 1(u) if and only if for some i = 0, 1, . . ., si u = a, si+1 u = b, and for some j i, sj u = c.
Thus, satisﬁability of 1(u) is invariant under stuttering. 11 A rather involved argument in Section 8 shows that 1(u)
is equivalent to no STLA formula. 12 Actually we prove a stronger result: we show that 1(u) is equivalent to no
STLAQ formula, 13 see Deﬁnition 35 in Section 8.
Example 10 also indicates a kind of asymmetry of STLA. The statement that event u = a∧u′ = b takes place before
or at the same time with event u = c is not expressible there, whereas occurrence of the events in the reverse order is
expressible by STLA formula (u = c ∧ 〈u = a ∧ u′ = b〉u). Lamport gives no explanation why events described
by actions containing prime can appear after events described by actions not containing prime, but are not allowed to
appear before.
As it was argued in [11], formulas of the form
 (〈A1〉t ∧ 〈A2〉t ), (1)
where A1 and A2 are actions, are very useful in program speciﬁcations. These formulas state that action A1 will
eventually take place and action A2 will take place in the same or some later state. In particular, formulas stating that
one process starts (or terminates) before or at the same time when the other does are of the form (1), see [11]. All
this, of course, applies to our particular example of 1(u), where events u = a ∧ u′ = b and u = c are interpreted as
starts or terminations of two concurrent processes. 14 Thus, impossibility to express formulas of the form (1) in STLA
indicates its deﬁciency.
For speciﬁcation purposes, one can circumvent this problem by replacing1(u) with[v = u′]{u,v} ∧(u = a∧v =
b ∧ u = c), denoted as 2(u, v), where v is a new “invisible” ﬂexible variable. Then each temporal interpretation
satisfying2(u, v) also satisﬁes1(u), and each temporal interpretation satisfying1(u) can be extended to a temporal
interpretation that satisﬁes 2(u, v), cf. [2].
Remark 11. Note that 1(u) is not equivalent to 2(u, v). Nevertheless, it is equivalent to ∃v2(u, v), but the latter
is not an RTLA (or even an RTLAQ) formula. Of course, the above mentioned rewriting, which “eliminates primes,”
applies to any RTLAQ formula whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering. However, as it was pointed out in [11],
usually, addition of invisible variables is not natural or convenient.
Note that, if a = b, then 1(u) is equivalent to 〈u = a ∧ u′ = b ∧ u = c〉u. The latter looks like an STLA
formula: the “only” difference is that u = a ∧ u′ = b ∧ u = c is not an action. As we show in this paper, restricting
11 See also Theorem 15 below.
12 Usually, it is much easier to rewrite a formula in a desired form than to prove that such a rewriting is not possible.
13 Obviously, 1(u) is expressible in full (second-order) Lamport’s TLA.
14 Namely, one process starts/terminates when control variable u changes its value from a to b and the other starts/terminates when u assumes
value c.
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applications of  and  to the state change results in a “stutter-invariant” fragment ESTLAQ of RTLAQ that is strong
enough to express all stutter-invariant properties deﬁnable in RTLAQ. Restricting ESTLAQ to RTLA formulas gives
us a “stutter-invariant” fragment ESTLA of RTLA in which one can express all stutter-invariant properties deﬁnable
in RTLA.
ESTLAQ formulas are deﬁned together with so called pre-ESTLAQ formulas, see the deﬁnition below.
Deﬁnition 12 (cf. Merz [11, Deﬁnition 1]).
• Actions are pre-ESTLAQ formulas and actions with no appearance of ′ are ESTLAQ formulas.
• If  and  are ESTLAQ formulas, then so are  ⊃ , , and ∃x.
• If  is a pre-ESTLAQ formula and t is a term not containing ′, then []t is an ESTLAQ formula.
• Each ESTLAQ formula is also a pre-ESTLAQ formula.
• If  and  are pre-ESTLAQ formulas, then so are  ⊃  and ∃x.
Remark 13. It follows from Deﬁnition 12 that pre-ESTLAQ formulas are ﬁrst-order combinations of ESTLAQ for-
mulas and actions.
Remark 14. Let V be the set of all ﬂexible variables which appear in formula  under consideration. Then []t is
equivalent to [ ∨ t ′ = t]V . That is, in Deﬁnition 12 it sufﬁces to consider the restriction of  (respectively, ) by
V′ = V (respectively, V′ = V) only, see also the proof of Theorem 17 in the next section.
Theorem 15. Satisﬁability of ESTLAQ formulas is invariant under stuttering.
For the proof of Theorem 15 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Let (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, be a ﬁrst-order combination of formulas whose satisﬁability is invariant under
stuttering and actions. Let S = s0, s1, . . ., s1 = s0, be a temporal interpretation and let d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS . Then
S(d) if and only if S(d).
Proof. We may assume that (x) is of the form Q1y1 · · ·Qkyk(y1, . . . , yk, x), where each Qi is either ∃ or ∀,
i = 1, . . . , k, and (x) is a propositional combination of formulas whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering and
actions. The proof is by induction on the number of quantiﬁers k.
The basis k = 0 is immediate, because in this case(x) is a propositional combination of formulaswhose satisﬁability
is invariant under stuttering and actions whose satisﬁability depends only on the ﬁrst two states of S and S which are,
respectively, the same, due to the assumption s1 = s0.
For the induction step, let (x) be of the form ∃x′(x, x), where ′(x, x) is a propositional combination of formulas
whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering and actions preﬁxed with k quantiﬁers. Then
S ∃x′(x, d)
if and only if
for some d ∈ DS , S′(d, d) (by the deﬁnition of )
if and only if
for some d ∈ DS , S′(d, d) (by the induction hypothesis)
if and only if
S ∃x′(x, d) (by the deﬁnition of ).
The case in which (x) is of the form ∀x′(x, x) is treated in a similar manner. 
Proof of Theorem 15. The proof is by induction on the structure of . The basis is immediate, because ESTLAQ
formulas of the lowest structural complexity are STLA formulas. For the induction step, in view of Proposition 9, we
have only to show that for a pre-ESTLAQ formula , satisﬁability of 〈〉t is invariant under stuttering. That is, for a
temporal interpretation S = s0, s1, . . ., S  〈〉t if and only if S  〈〉t .
Assume that S  〈〉t . Then for some i = 0, 1, . . .,
S+i  ∧ t ′ = t.
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In particular, S+i  t ′ = t implies si+1 = si which, in turn, implies i = (j) for some j = 0, 1, . . . , i, see Deﬁnition 7.
Then si+1 = s(j+1) and we have
(S+i ) = s(j), s(j+1), · · · = (S)+j .
By Remark 13, is a ﬁrst-order combination of ESTLAQ formulas (whose satisﬁability, by the induction hypothesis,
is invariant under stuttering) and actions. Since t ′ = t is also an action, by Lemma 16, (S)+j ∧ t ′ = t . Therefore,
S  〈〉t .
Reading the above proof backward (with necessary modiﬁcations) shows that S  〈〉t implies S  〈〉t . 
Theorem 17. Each RTLAQ formula whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering is equivalent to an ESTLAQ
formula.
The proof of Theorem 17 is presented in the next section.
Deﬁnition 18 (cf. Deﬁnition 5). ESTLA consists of all ESTLAQ formulas which do not contain  in the scopes
(of rigid variable) quantiﬁers. 15
That is, the deﬁnition of ESTLA results from Deﬁnition 12 in deleting the subscript Q and replacing the second and
last clauses with
• if  and  are ESTLA formulas, then so are  ⊃  and  and
• if  and  are pre-ESTLA formulas, then so is  ⊃ , respectively.
As an easy corollary to the proof of Theorem 17 we obtain that each RTLA formula whose satisﬁability is invariant
under stuttering is equivalent to an ESTLA formula, see Remark 29 at the end of Section 7.
Remark 19. In fact, for the proof of Theorem 17, in Deﬁnition 12 we do not need the clause stating that for an
ESTLAQ formula ,  is also an ESTLAQ formula, see Section 7. We introduced this clause just to let ESTLAQ be
an extension of STLA.
7. Proof of Theorem 17
For the proof of Theorem 17 we shall need the following deﬁnitions and notation.
Deﬁnition 20. A temporal interpretation S is called unstuttered if S = S.
Deﬁnition 21. A temporal interpretation S = s0, s1, . . . is called almost unstuttered if s1 = s0 and S+1 = S+1.
For a temporal interpretation S = s0, s1, . . . we denote almost unstuttered temporal interpretation s0, S by 1S. That
is, 1S is a unique almost unstuttered temporal interpretation S1 such that S1 = S.
Proposition 22 (cf. Peled and Wilke [12, Corollary 3]). LetI consist of all almost unstuttered temporal interpretations
and let (x) and (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, be RTLAQ formulas whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering. Then
I (x) ≡ (x) implies that (x) and (x) are equivalent.
Proof. Let S be a temporal interpretation and let d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS . Then
S(d)
if and only if
1S(d) (because satisﬁability of (x) is invariant under stuttering)
if and only if
1S(d) (because 1S ∈ I and I (x) ≡ (x))
15 That is, ESTLA is the restriction of ESTLAQ to RTLA.
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if and only if
S(d) (because satisﬁability of (x) is invariant under stuttering). 
Since, by Theorem 15, satisﬁability of ESTLAQ formulas is invariant under stuttering, by Proposition 22, it sufﬁces
to show that each RTLA formula whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering is equivalent to an ESTLAQ formula
with respect to class I of all almost unstuttered interpretations, cf. [12, the proof of Theorem 1].
We shall treat the cases of non-halted and halted temporal interpretations separately. These temporal interpretations
are deﬁned by STLA formulas   〈〉V and [⊥]V , respectively, where V denotes the set of all ﬂexible variables
which appear in the formula under consideration, see Remark 14.
Proposition 23. Let  be an RTLAQ formula and let S be a non-halted, unstuttered or almost unstuttered temporal
interpretation. Then S ≡ ( ∧[]V ).
Proof. Let  be (x), x = x1, . . . , xm and let d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS . Then obviously, S(d) implies S(d) ∧
[(d)]V .
Conversely, assume S(d) ∧ [(d)]V . Then, in particular, S+0 (d) and, for i > 0, S+i (d), because
S+i V′ = V. 
Corollary 24. For each RTLAQ formula  there exists a pre-ESTLAQ formula ∗ that is equivalent to  with respect
to all non-halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations.
Proof. Actually, we shall construct a pre-ESTLAQ formula∗ that is equivalent towith respect to both all non-halted
unstuttered and all non-halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations. The proof is by induction on the structure
of .
Basis: If  does not contain , then it is already a pre-ESTLAQ formula and we let ∗ be .
Induction step: If  is of the form 1 ⊃ 2, then ∗ is ∗1 ⊃ ∗2 and the equivalence of  and ∗ with respect to both
all non-halted unstuttered and all non-halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations immediately follows from the
induction hypothesis.
If  is of the form ∃x(x), then ∗ is ∃x∗(x) and the equivalence of  and ∗ with respect to both all non-halted
unstuttered and all non-halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations immediately follows from the induction
hypothesis and validity of ((x) ≡ ∗(x)) ⊃ (∃x(x) ≡ ∃x∗(x)).
If is of the form(x), x = x1, . . . , xm, then∗ is∗(x)∧[∗(x)]V . To show that and∗ are equivalent with
respect to both all non-halted unstuttered and all non-halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations we observe the
following.
Let S be a non-halted, unstuttered or almost unstuttered temporal interpretation, d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS , and let i be a
non-negative integer. Then S+i is a non-halted, unstuttered or almost unstuttered temporal interpretation as well. Thus,
by the induction hypothesis, S+i (d) if and only if S+i ∗(d), implying S(d) if and only if S∗(d) and
the desired equivalence follows from the induction hypothesis, Deﬁnition 12, and Proposition 23. 
For dealing with halted temporal interpretations we shall need the following notation and deﬁnition.
For an RTLAQ formula  we denote by − the result of replacement of each occurrence of a term of the form x′ in
it with x. That is, loosely speaking, − results in “removing” all primes from . We omit a formal deﬁnition. Note that
− is an ESTLAQ formula.
Deﬁnition 25. A temporal interpretation s0, s1, . . . is called degenerate, if si = s0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . .
Proposition 26. Let  be an RTLAQ formula and S be a degenerate temporal interpretation. Then S− ≡ .
Proof. It follows from the deﬁnition of degenerate temporal interpretations that for any ﬂexible variable x and any
i = 0, 1, . . ., S+i  x′ = x, and the proposition follows by a straightforward induction on the structure of an RTLAQ
formula. 
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Proposition 27. Let  be an RTLAQ formula and let S be a halted, unstuttered or almost unstuttered temporal inter-
pretation. Then S ≡ ( ∧[]V ∧ −).
Proof. Let  be (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DmS , and let n be the minimal integer for which S+n is
degenerate.
If S(d), then, obviously, S(d) ∧ [(d)]V , and S  −(d) follows from S+n (d) and
Proposition 26.
Conversely, assume S(d)∧[(d)]V ∧−(d). Then S+i (d) for i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1, because S+0 (d)
and S+i V′ = V for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Also, since S  −(d), S+m −(d), for some mn, implying
S+n −(d), because S+m and S+n are the same degenerate temporal interpretations. Thus, for in, S+i (d)
follows from S+n −(d) and Proposition 26. 
Corollary 28. For each RTLAQ formula  there exists a pre-ESTLAQ formula ∗∗ that is equivalent to  with respect
to all halted almost unstuttered temporal interpretations.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 24. The only difference is the case in which  is of the form . In
this case ∗∗ is ∗∗ ∧[∗∗]V ∧ −. 16 We leave the details to the reader. 
Now it follows from Corollaries 24 and 28 that each RTLAQ formula  is equivalent, with respect to I, to the
conjunction of   〈〉V ⊃ ∗ and [⊥]V ⊃ ∗∗, denoted by . Note that  is a pre-ESTLAQ formula.
Let  be the formula resulting from  by removing all primes which do not appear in the scope of some. Then, by
Remark 13,  is an ESTLAQ formula. Since almost unstuttered temporal interpretations satisfy V′ = V, I  ≡ .
This together with I  ≡  implies I  ≡ , and Theorem 17 follows from Proposition 22.
Remark 29. It follows from the proofs of Corollaries 24 and 28 that if  is an RTLA formula, then  is an ESTLA
formula. Therefore, each RTLA formula whose satisﬁability is invariant under stuttering is equivalent to an ESTLA
formula.
We conclude this section with a note that in PLTL, rewriting stutter-invariant formulas in the form not containing
“next” by using invariant under stuttering “until” (see [12]) is very convenient from a technical point of view. 17
Rewriting stutter-invariant formulas in a canonical form in a logic not containing “until” appears to be a more
difﬁcult task.
8. An Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game on temporal interpretations and the proof of Example 10
The proof of Example 10 is quite long, because STLA seems to be a rather rich logic. The proof is based on the
following version of Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games [5,8] on unstuttered temporal interpretations, which will be referred
to just as the game, cf. [7]. 18
The game is a game of two players and is played on a pair of temporal interpretations S0 = s0,0, s0,1, . . . and
S1 = s1,0, s1,1, . . . . The n-round (version of the) game, n = 0, 1, . . . , is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• In the 0-round game, there are no rounds to be played: if s0,0 = s1,0, Player I wins; otherwise, i.e., if s0,0 = s1,0,
Player II wins.
• In the 1-round game, Player I wins, if s0,0 = s1,0. Otherwise, the ﬁnal round is played as described below:
1. Player I chooses  ∈ {0, 1} and a position i ∈ N on S.
2. Player II responds by choosing a position i1− ∈ N on S1−.
3. If s,i = s1−,i1− or s,i+1 = s1−,i1−+1, Player I wins; otherwise, Player II wins.
16 Equivalently, we could deﬁne ∗∗ as ∗∗ ∧[∗∗]V ∧ (∗∗)−, because, with respect to halted, unstuttered or almost unstuttered temporal
interpretations, (∗∗)− is equivalent to −.
17 However, as it was pointed out in [1], “formulas with nested occurrences of “until” are too often incomprehensible.” It seems that this is the
reason for which Lamport [9] uses RTLA where the “until” operator is not expressible.
18 The suggestion to use Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games for the proof of Example 10 came from one of the referees. The original proof was based on
a long sequence of technical syntactical transformations.
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• In the (n + 1)-round game (n > 1), Player I wins, if s0,0 = s1,0. Otherwise, one non-ﬁnal round is played, which
results either in a win for Player I or in a new pair of temporal interpretations on which the players play an n-round
game.
A non-ﬁnal round of the game is played as follows:
1. Player I chooses  ∈ {0, 1} and a position i ∈ N on S.
2. Player II responds by choosing a position i1− ∈ N on S1−.
3. If s,i = s1−,i1− , Player I wins; otherwise, the new temporal interpretations are S+i and S
+i1−
1− .
We say that Player II has a winning strategy in the n-round game on S0 and S1, denoted as S0 ∼n S1, if he/she can
win this game, regardless of the moves made by Player I.
Remark 30. Note that if S0 ∼n S1, then DS0 = DS1 . Moreover, the states of both temporal interpretations differ only
in assignments to ﬂexible variables.
For the examples below it will be convenient to identify temporal interpretations with -words over the (inﬁnite)
alphabet of all possible states. That is, the ith state of a temporal interpretation is the state that appears in the ith position
of the corresponding -word.
Example 31. Let S be a temporal interpretation, s and t be states, and let n be a non-negative integer. We shall prove
by induction on n that (st)n+1S ∼n (st)n+2S. 19 For the proof we shall consider all possible ﬁrst moves of Player I.
Basis: Here we have to consider the cases of both n = 0 and n = 1, because in these cases winning of Player I is
deﬁned differently. The case of n = 0 is trivial and for the case of n = 1 we proceed as follows:
• If Player I starts by choosing position i on (st)n+1S, then Player II responds by choosing position i +2 on (st)n+2S,
and the result follows from equality ((st)n+1S)+i = ((st)n+2S)+(i+2).
• If Player I starts by choosing position 0 (respectively, position 1) on (st)n+2S, then Player II responds by choosing
position 0 (respectively, position 1) on (st)n+1S. (Recall that n = 1.)
• If Player I starts by choosing position i2 on (st)n+2S, then Player II responds by choosing position i − 2 on
(st)n+1S, and the result follows from equality ((st)n+2S)+i = ((st)n+1S)+(i−2).
Induction step: Assume that the equivalence holds for n (n1) and prove it for n + 1, i.e., for (n + 1)-round game
played on (st)n+2S and (st)n+3S.
• If Player I starts by choosing position i on (st)n+2S, then, like in the case of n = 1, Player II responds by choosing
position i + 2 on (st)n+3S.
• If Player I starts by choosing position 0 (respectively, position 1) on (st)n+3S, then Player II responds by choosing
position 0 (respectively, position 1) on (st)n+2S, and the result follows from the induction hypothesis for (st)n+1(stS)
and (st)n+2(stS) (respectively, from the induction hypothesis for (ts)n+1(sS) and (ts)n+2(sS)).
• Finally, if Player I starts by choosing position i2 on (st)n+3S, then, like in the case of n = 1, Player II responds
by choosing position i − 2 on (st)n+2S.
Remark 32. A bit more detailed analysis shows that for n > 0 we have (st)n+1S ∼2n−1 (st)n+2S. However, Example
31 is still sufﬁcient for our purpose.
Example 33. Let r, s, and t be states, n be a non-negative integer, and let kn. We shall prove by induction on n that
rt (st)krsrt ∼n r(st)k+1rsrt.
Basis: The case of n = 0 is trivial and the case of n = 1 is treated similarly to that in Example 31. Namely, we
proceed as follows:
• If Player I starts by choosing position 0 on rt (st)krsrt then Player II responds by choosing position 2k + 5 on
r(st)k+1rsrt, and, symmetrically, if Player I starts by choosing position 0 on r(st)k+1rsrt then Player II responds
by choosing position 2k + 2 on rt (st)krsrt.
• If Player I starts by choosing position i1 on rt (st)krsrt, then Player II responds by choosing position i + 1 on
r(st)k+1rsrt, and the result follows from equality (rt (st)krsrt)+i = (r(st)k+1rsrt)+(i+1).
19 Recall that, in the -word notation, (st)kS is a temporal interpretation such that ((st)kS)+2k = S and for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1, the ith state of
(st)kS is s, if i is even, and is t, if i is odd.
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• If Player I starts by choosing position 1 on r(st)k+1rsrt, then Player II responds by choosing position 2 on
rt (st)krsrt.
• If Player I starts by choosing position i2 on r(st)k+1rsrt then Player II responds by choosing position i − 1 on
rt (st)krsrt, and the result follows from equality (r(st)k+1rsrt)+i = (rt (st)krsrt)+(i−1).
Induction step: We assume that the equivalence holds for n (n1) and prove it for n + 1. The proof is similar to the
basis case.
• If Player I starts by choosing position 0 on either of the temporal structures, then Player II responds by choosing
position 0 on the other, and the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
• The cases in which Player I starts by choosing position i1 on rt (st)krsrt, or by choosing position i2 on
r(st)k+1rsrt are treated exactly like in the basis.
• Finally, let Player I start by choosing position 1 on r(st)k+1rsrt. Then Player II responds by choosing position 2
on rt (st)krsrt, and the result follows from Example 31 with S = (st)k−(n+1)rsrt.
The proof of Example 10 is based on Proposition 36 below for which we need the notion of modal depth of an
RTLAQ formula and the deﬁnition of STLA with unrestricted quantiﬁcation (STLAQ).
Deﬁnition 34. The modal depth of an RTLAQ formula , denoted as ||, is deﬁned by the following induction.
• If  has no occurrences of , then || = 0.
• If  is of the form ∃x, then || = ||.
• If  is of the form 1 ⊃ 2, then || = max(|1|, |2|).
• Finally, if  is of the form , then || = || + 1.
That is, || is the maximal number of nested appearances of  in .
Next we deﬁne STLAQ as the fragment of RTLAQ, where each action A containing ′ appears in the form [A]t .
Deﬁnition 35 (cf. Deﬁnitions 6 and 12).
• Actions not containing ′ are STLAQ formulas.
• If A is an action and t is a term not containing ′, then [A]t is an STLAQ formula.
• If  and  are STLAQ formulas, then so are  ⊃ , ∃x, and .
Proposition 36. Let (x), x = x1, . . . , xm, be an STLAQ formula and let n |(x)|. Let S0 and S1 be tempo-
ral interpretations such that S0 ∼n S1 and let d = d1, . . . , dm ∈ DS0 (= DS1). 20 Then S0 (d) if and only if
S1 (d). 21
For the proof of Proposition 36 we shall need the following observation.
Lemma 37. Let S0 and S1 be temporal interpretations and let n1 and n2 be non-negative integers such that n1 > n2.
Then S0 ∼n1 S1 implies S0 ∼n2 S1.
Proof. Obviously, it sufﬁces to show that for each non-negative integer n, S0 ∼n+1 S1 implies S0 ∼n S1. The case of
n = 0 immediately follows from the deﬁnition. Let n > 0, S0 ∼n+1 S1, and assume that in an n-round game on S0 and
S1 Player I starts by choosing position i0 on S0. We have to show that there exists a non-negative integer i1 such that
S+i00 ∼n−1 S+i11 . (2)
Consider an n + 1 round game in the ﬁrst round of which Player I starts by choosing position 0 on S0 and Player
II responds by choosing position j1 on S1 according to his/her winning strategy. Let in the second round of this game
20 See Remark 30.
21 Actually, the proof below shows that the proposition can be extended to the logic whose formulas are built by the means of ⊃, , and ∃ from
actions not containing ′ and formulas of the form A, where A is an action.
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Player I choose position i0 on S0 and let Player II respond by choosing position j2 on S+j11 according to his/her winning
strategy. Then S+i00 ∼n−1 (S+j11 )+j2 and (2) holds with i1 = j1 + j2. 
Proof of Proposition 36. It sufﬁces to show that S0 (d) implies S1 (d), because the proof of the other direction
is symmetric. The proof is by induction on |(d)| and is similar to that of [7, Theorem 3.1].
Basis: The case of |(d)| = 0 is immediate, because S0 ∼n S1 implies s0,0 = s1,0. For the case of |(d)| = 1,
we may assume that (d) is of the form 〈A〉t , where A is an action. This is because if S0 and S1 “agree” on all such
formulas and all formulas of modal depth 0, they also “agree” on their ﬁrst-order combinations. Let S0   〈A〉t . That
is, there exists a non-negative integer i0 such that S+i00  〈A〉t . By Lemma 37, we may assume that n = 1. Let Player I
start by choosing position i0 on S0 and let Player II respond by choosing position i1 on S1, according to his/her winning
strategy. Then s0,i0 = s1,i1 and s0,i0+1 = s1,i1+1, implying, S+i11  〈A〉t . Therefore, S1 (d).
Induction step: Like in the case of n = 1, we may restrict ourselves to the case in which (d) is of the form
(d). Let n |  (d)| and let S0   (d). That is, there exists a non-negative integer i0 such that S+i00 (d).
Let Player I start by choosing position i0 on S0 and let Player II respond by choosing position i1 on S1, according to
his/her winning strategy. Then S+i00 ∼n−1 S+i11 and, since n − 1 |(d)|, by the induction hypothesis, S+i11 (d).
Therefore, S1   (d). 
Now we are ready for the proof of Example 10.
Proof of Example 10. Assume to the contrary that 1(u) is equivalent to some STLAQ formula . (Recall that 1(u)
is the formula (u = a ∧ u′ = b ∧ u = c) from Example 10.)
Let r, s, and t be states in which the interpretations of constant symbols a, b, and c are pairwise different, such that
r u = a, s u = c, and t  u = b.
Let n ||, and let S0 = rt (st)nrsrt and S1 = r(st)n+1rsrt. 22 By Example 33 with k = n, S0 ∼n S1. Thus,
by Proposition 36, S0  if and only if S1 . However, S0 satisﬁes 1(u), whereas S1 does not, which contradicts
our assumption that 1(u) is equivalent to . 
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